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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1993, the Colorado General Assembly enacted Colorado
Revised Statute section 18-9-122 in response to concerns re-
garding open access to Colorado health care facilities for the
purposes of medical counseling and treatment.' Balancing "a
person's right to protest or counsel against certain medical pro-
cedures . . . against another person's right to obtain medical
counseling and treatment in a unobstructed manner," the Gen-
eral Assembly declared it appropriate to regulate speech-re-
lated activities within 100 feet of the entrance to any health
care facility.2 Five months after the statute was enacted, sev-
eral anti-abortion protestors brought an action in Colorado
state court, seeking a declaratory judgment that the statute
facially violated the First Amendment and a permanent injunc-
tion against its enforcement. 3 In 2000, the Supreme Court ren-
dered its decision in Hill v. Colorado,4 upholding the statute
against the protestors' contentions, and clarifying the proper re-
view of generally applicable legislation that regulates speech in
the traditional public forum surrounding health care facilities.5
1. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122(1) (West 1993).
2. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122 (West 1993).
3. See Hill v. Lakewood, 911 P.2d 670, 670 (Colo. App. 1995).
4. 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
5. See id.
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Part II of this case note summarizes the relevant back-
ground information regarding regulation of free speech in the
public forum, particularly in the context of health care facilities.
Part III provides the factual and legal background of the Hill v.
Colorado decision. Part IV outlines in detail the Court's deci-
sion, including the separate opinions of the Justices. Part V
concludes that Hill v. Colorado provides the framework the
Court's majority will use in reviewing generally applicable leg-
islation that regulates speech in public forum surrounding
health care facilities.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Freedom of Speech in Traditional Public Forum
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution
provides that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech."6 Although the language of the First Amend-
ment provides no express conditions or exceptions, the Court
has held that the First Amendment's protections of the freedom
of speech are not "absolutes."7 "[T]he First Amendment does not
guarantee the right to communicate one's views at all times and
places or in any manner that may be desired."8 However, the
Court's "preferential treatment" of the First Amendment is ex-
emplified in many of its analyses and standards of review.9
While there is debate in regard to the framers' precise in-
tentions when drafting this provision of the First Amendment, 10
one prominent theory advanced is the necessity of preserving
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I. In full, the First Amendment states "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exer-
cise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." Id. The First Amendment applies to all states via the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 196
(1992).
7. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961).
8. Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647
(1981).
9. See JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.7
(6th ed. 2000). These techniques include: application of a narrow presumption of
constitutionality; strict construction of statutes to avoid limitation of First Amend-
ment freedoms; restriction of prior restraint; relaxed requirements of standing to
bring suit; and heightened standards of procedural due process. See id.
10. See id.
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the market place of ideas from government suppression and
censorship." As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the First
Amendment insists that "governments must not be allowed to
choose 'which issues are worth discussing or debating."' 12 This
principle is most widely recognized in relation to the "quintes-
sential public forum" of sidewalks and streets, as these places
"'have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public
and . . . used for purposes of assembly, communicating of
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions." ' 13
B. Regulation of Speech in Traditional Public Forum
In determining what treatment to give a law that is
claimed to constitute an unconstitutional restriction of the free-
dom of speech in the traditional public forum, a court must first
determine whether the regulation is content-based or content
neutral. 14 The analysis of content-neutrality is of threshold im-
portance because the distinction between a content-neutral or
content-based regulation is determinative of the level of scru-
tiny to which the court will subject the law. 15
In determining content-neutrality, "[tihe government's pur-
pose is the controlling consideration." 16 The principal inquiry is
"whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech be-
cause of disagreement with the message it conveys."' 7 A law
that regulates speech is content-neutral so long as it is "'justi-
fied without reference to the content of the regulated speech.'"18
Additionally, a law that has an incidental effect on some speak-
11. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing). Other prominent theories include: prevention of human error through igno-
rance (derived from John Milton's "Areopagitica"); public enlightenment resulting
from the free exchange of ideas (derived John Stuart Mill's "On Liberty"); and en-
hancement of individual self-fulfillment. See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 9
§ 16.6.
12. Consol. Edison Co. of New York v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530,
538 (1980) (quoting Police Dep't. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1997)).
13. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (quot-
ing Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 490, 515 (1939)).
14. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
15. See, e.g., Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976);
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
16. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
17. Id. (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,
295 (1984)).
18. Id. at 791 (quoting Clark, 468 U.S. at 293).
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ers and not others is content-neutral if the regulation serves
purposes unrelated to the content of the expression. 19
If the court finds the law regulates speech on the basis of
content, it will subject the law to strict scrutiny, requiring the
State to demonstrate that the law is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest.20 If the court determines that the law
is content-neutral, it will analyze the law as a "time, place, and
manner" restriction, requiring the State to demonstrate that
the law is narrowly tailored to serve a significant government
interest, and leaves open ample alternative channels of commu-
nication. 21 Thus, a statute found to be content-based is sub-
jected to more rigorous and exacting scrutiny than a content-
neutral statute.
C. Regulation of Speech Surrounding Health Care Facilities
Since 1973, when Roe v. Wade22 judicially legalized abor-
tion, anti-abortion protestors have shifted their battle from the
courtroom to the streets and sidewalks surrounding health care
facilities. 23 Abortion opponents contend that the space outside
health care facilities has become, by necessity, "a forum of last
resort for those who oppose abortion"24 and "the most effective
place, if not the only place"25 where persuasion against abortion
procedures can effectively occur. Abortion opponents employ va-
rious media to convey their messages, including picketing,
leafleting, displaying signs, and communicating verbally.26
19. See id. at 791.
20. See, e.g, Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976);
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
21. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. Here, the Court stated "the requirement of
narrow tailoring is satisfied 'so long as the ... regulation promotes a substantial
government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation'"
and "it need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so." Id. at
798-99.
22. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
23. See Kathryn D. Piele, Sabelko v. City of Phoenix: Ninth Circuit Refuses to
Burst "Bubble" Protecting Women Entering Health Care Facilities, 75 OR. L. REV.
1297 (1996).
24. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. at 763 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
25. Id.
26. See Amy E. Miller, The Collapse and Fall of Floating Buffer Zones: The
Court Clarifies Analysis of Reviewing Speech-Restrictive Injunctions in Schenck v.
Pro-Choice Network, 32 U. RiCH. L. Rev. 275, 277-78 (1998).
20011 243
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Unfortunately, under some circumstances, various anti-
abortion groups have resorted to physically and verbally abu-
sive behavior in an attempt to discourage or impede both wo-
men's and physicians' access to health care facilities where
abortions are performed. 27 While Roe v. Wade secured a wo-
man's right to obtain abortion-related counseling and medical
procedures, it did not assure safe and unimpeded access to med-
ical facilities.28 In two recent cases, the Court reviewed judicial
injunctions that, in an attempt to alleviate tension, essentially
created a zone of separation between anti-abortion protestors
and citizens seeking access to health care facilities.29
In Madsen v Women's Health Center, Inc.,30 the Court ex-
amined an injunction that was issued by a Florida state court
after the court found that anti-abortion protestors had repeat-
edly impeded access to abortion clinics in violation of an ex-
isting injunction.31 Such activities had discouraged patients
from entering the clinic and had deleterious physical effects on
the others. 32 The Supreme Court found the injunction to be con-
tent-neutral, stating that the court had imposed the restrictions
on the protestors "incidental to their antiabortion message be-
cause they repeatedly violated the court's original order."33 In
examining the injunction, the Court found that a "more strin-
gent" treatment of a content-neutral injunction was applicable
and held that the proper inquiry was "whether the challenged
provisions of the injunction burden[ed] no more speech than
necessary to serve a significant government interest."34
Under the newly announced level of scrutiny, the Court
struck down a provision of the injunction that prohibited protes-
tors from physically approaching any person seeking services of
the abortion clinic in an area within 300 feet of the clinic "un-
less such a person indicate[d] a desire to communicate." 35 The
27. See id.
28. See Roe, 410 U.S. 113.
29. See Schneck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357 (1997); Madsen v. Wo-
men's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
30. 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
31. See id. at 758-76.
32. See id. at 758.
33. Id. at 763.
34. Id. at 765.
35. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 773.
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Court found that the "prohibition on all uninvited approaches of
persons seeking the services of the clinic, regardless of how
peaceable the contact may be" burdened more speech than nec-
essary to serve the state interest of preventing intimidation and
ensuring access to the clinic.36 The Court also noted that "in
public debate our own citizens must tolerate insulting, and even
outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate breathing
space to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment." 37
In Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 38
the Court examined an injunction issued by a New York district
court after that court found anti-abortion protestors had repeat-
edly impeded access and formed "constructive blockades" in vio-
lation of an existing restraining order.39 Applying the standard
announced in Madsen, the Court struck down a provision of the
injunction that prohibited protestors from "demonstrating"
within fifteen feet of any person or vehicle seeking access to the
clinic.40 The Court found that the provision "burden[ed] more
speech than [was] necessary to serve the relevant governmental
interests" in safeguarding the safety and health of clinic staff
and patients, and maintaining traffic flow.41 The Court also
noted that "leafletting and commenting on matters of public
concern are classic forms of speech that lie at the heart of the
First Amendment, and speech in public areas is at its most pro-
tected on public sidewalks, a prototypical example of a tradi-
tional public forum."42 The Court, however, expressly declined
to comment as to whether governmental interests could ever
justify a zone of separation between individuals entering abor-
tion clinics and protestors. 43
36. Id. at 774.
37. Id.
38. 519 U.S. 357 (1997).
39. Id. at 519 U.S. at 364-67.
40. See id. at 377.
41. Id. This provision of the injunction specifically enjoined the protestors
from "demonstrating within fifteen feet of any person or vehicle seeking access to
or leaving facilities." Id. at 367.
42. Schenck, 519 U.S. at 377.
43. See id.
20011 245
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III. FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND OF THE
HILL v. COLORADO DECISION
A. Colorado Revised Statute Section 18-9-122
In 1993, the Colorado General Assembly proposed to enact
Colorado Revised Statute section 18-9-122 in response to con-
cerns regarding open access to Colorado health care facilities for
the purpose of medical counseling and treatment.44 While the
legislation was pending, the General Assembly held public
hearings to determine the nature and extent of verbal and phys-
ical abuse to which citizens were subjected while seeking medi-
cal counseling and treatment at health care facilities.45 At one
of the hearings, testimony was presented concerning the
harassing and obstructive conduct of some anti-abortion protes-
tors directed at both patients and staff at various medical clin-
ics. 46 The legislature also heard testimony that other types of
protests, such as those made by animal rights activists, oc-
curred at medical clinics where animal organ transplants were
performed. 47 One witness indicated that protestors created a
particular impediment of access to persons with physical disa-
bilities who lack the physical capability to move through
crowds. 48 In recognition that "access to health care facilities for
the purpose of obtaining medical counseling and treatment"
was imperative to the citizens of Colorado,49 the General As-
sembly enacted Colorado Revised Statute section 18-9-122 to
regulate speech-related activities within 100 feet of the en-
trance to any health care facility.
In subsection 18-9-122(1), the General Assembly set forth
the public concerns that motivated that statute's enactment. 50
In an effort to balance "the exercise of a person's right to protest
or counsel against certain medical procedures" and "another
person's right to obtain medical counseling and treatment in an
unobstructed manner," the General Assembly declared that "it
is appropriate to enact legislation that prohibits a person from
44. See Hill v. Thomas, 973 P.2d 1246, 1250 (Colo. 1997).
45. Id. at 1249 (citations omitted).
46. See Hill v. Lakewood, 911 P.2d at 672 (citations omitted).
47. See id. (citations omitted).
48. See id. (citations omitted).
49. COLO. REV. STAT. §18-9-122(1).
50. Id.
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knowingly obstructing another person's entry to or exit from a
health care facility."51 Subsection 18-9-122(3) sets forth the sub-
stantive restrictions embodied by the statute:
No person shall knowingly approach another within eight feet of
such person, unless such other person consents, for the purposes
of passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging
in oral protest, education, or counseling with such other person in
the public way or sidewalk area within a radius of one hundred
feet from any entrance door to a health care facility. Any person
who violates this subsection (3) commits a class 3 misdemeanor. 52
In essence, subsection (3) creates a 100-foot regulated radius
around Colorado health care facilities as a "fixed buffer zone."5 3
Within that fixed buffer zone, an eight-foot regulated radius
around each person exists, termed by the Supreme Court of Col-
orado as a "limited floating buffer zone."54
B. Constitutional Challenge and District Court Decision
Five months after the passage of the statute, plaintiffs
Leila Hill, Audrey Himmelmann and Everitt Simpson (hereaf-
ter "plaintiffs") filed a complaint in the District Court for Jeffer-
son County, Colorado, seeking a declaratory judgment that
section 18-9-122(3) (hereafter "statute") facially violated the
First Amendment and a permanent injunction against enforce-
ment of the statute by the defendants, Thomas (as District At-
torney), the City of Lakewood, Norton (as Attorney General)
and the State of Colorado.55 In their complaint and subsequent
affidavits, the plaintiffs stated that they are "'sidewalk counsel-
ors' who offer abortion-bound women alternatives to that medi-
cal procedure." 56 They stated that, as part of their efforts, they
display signs as well as distribute written materials, including
51. Id.
52. COLO. REV. STAT. §18-9-122(3).
53. Hill v. Thomas, 973 P.2d at 1250.
54. Id.
55. See Hill v. Lakewood, 911 P.2d at 672.
56. Id. at 673. "'Sidewalk counseling' consists of efforts 'to educate, counsel,
persuade, or inform passersby about abortion and abortion alternatives by means
of verbal or written speech, including conversations and/or display of signs and/or
distribution of literature.'" Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 708 (2000) (citations
omitted).
20011
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leaflets and pamphlets. 57 Hill additionally stated she uses a fe-
tal model in her counseling techniques. 58 The plaintiffs alleged
that their counseling frequently entails being within eight feet
of other persons and "their fear of prosecution under the new
statute caused them 'to be chilled in the exercise of fundamen-
tal constitutional rights. ' ' 59
The plaintiffs claimed that the statute was unconstitu-
tional under the First Amendment of the federal Constitution
for a multitude of reasons. Specifically, they argued that (1) the
statute was a content-based restriction not justified by a com-
pelling state interest; (2) the statutory consent requirement was
invalid as a prior restraint on speech; and (3) the statute was
void for vagueness and overbroad.60 The defendants admitted to
virtually all of the factual allegations in their answer and filed a
motion for summary judgment supported by affidavits, includ-
ing a transcript of the hearings that preceded the statute's
enactment.61
The district court judge rejected the plaintiffs' overbreadth,
vagueness and prior restraint arguments, 62 and found that, be-
cause the statute had not actually been enforced against them,
the plaintiffs raised only a facial challenge.6 3 In finding that the
plaintiffs' "sidewalk counseling was conducted in a 'quintessen-
tial' public forum," the district court held that the "statute per-
missibly imposed content-neutral 'time, place, and manner
restrictions' that were narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government interest, and left open ample alternative channels
of communication." 64 The judge granted the defendants' motion
and dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint.65
57. Hill v. Lakewood, 911 P.2d at 673.
58. Id.
59. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. at 708-09 (citations omitted).
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. Id. at 710-11.
63. See id. at 710.
64. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. at 710 (citations omitted).
65. Id.
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C. Decision of the Court of Appeals of Colorado (1995)
The plaintiffs appealed the granting of summary judgment
by the district court in the Colorado Court of Appeals.66 The
court of appeals first addressed the issue of whether the statute
was content-based, as the plaintiffs contended.67 Finding the
Court's analysis in Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc. in-
structive, the appellate court reasoned that the statute at issue
was content-neutral "because the specific viewpoint of any per-
son who protests at a health care facility is not relevant to a
determination whether a violation of the statute has oc-
curred."68 The court of appeals then analyzed the statute under
the criteria provided in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, and held
that the restrictions imposed by the statute were "narrowly tai-
lored" to serve a significant government interest-namely, to
ensure the safe and unobstructed access to and from health care
facilities for patients and staff and left open "ample alternative
channels" for communication of the information. 69 After re-
jecting the plaintiffs' contentions that the statute was unconsti-
tutionally vague or constituted an unconstitutional prior
restraint on speech, the court of appeals affirmed the decision of
the district court. 70
D. Supreme Court of Colorado Denial of Review (1996) and
Writ to the Court
In 1996, the Supreme Court of Colorado denied the plain-
tiffs' petition for review71 and the plaintiffs sought certiorari
from the United States Supreme Court.72 In 1997, the Court
granted the writ, vacated the judgment of the Colorado Court of
Appeals and remanded the case to that court for further consid-
eration in light of the Court's Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of
Western New York decision.78
66. Hill v. Lakewood, 911 P.2d. at 672.
67. Id. at 673.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 674.
70. Id. at 674-75.
71. Hill v. Thomas, No. 95SC593, 1996 Colo. LEXIS 136 (Colo. Feb. 26, 1996).
72. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. at 712.
73. See Hill v. Colorado, 519 U.S. 1145 (1997).
2001] 249
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E. Court of Appeals of Colorado Decision on Remand (1997)
On remand, the Colorado Court of Appeals rejected the
plaintiffs' contention that the Court's holding in Schenck man-
dated that the statute be declared unconstitutional. 74 The court
noted that the Court in Schenck had expressly declined to hold
that a valid government interest ensuring access to health care
facilities might never be sufficient to justify a zone of separation
between individuals entering and leaving the facilities and
protestors.75 The court of appeals determined that, as a gener-
ally applicable content-neutral statute rather than an injunc-
tive order, its constitutionality was properly assessed under the
standard set forth in Ward.76 Under the Ward standard, the
court held that the statute's distance of eight feet (as compared
to the 15-foot floating buffer zone struck down in Schenck) and
consent requirement were "sufficient to protect that type of
speech on a public sidewalk .. ... 77 The court concluded that
Schenck did not compel the conclusion that the statute violated
the First Amendment and reinstated its judgment upholding
the statute's constitutional validity.78
F. Supreme Court of Colorado Decision (1999)
In 1999 the Supreme Court of Colorado granted certiorari
to determine whether the court of appeals erred in holding that
section 18-19-122 was constitutional under the United States
Supreme Court's remand to consider the statute under
Schenck. 79 After reviewing the language and legislative history
of the statute, the Supreme Court of Colorado began its analysis
by discussing the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights and the
"imperative" interests that the General Assembly enacted the
statute to serve.80 The court stated that the "First Amendment
is not an absolute prohibition. .. especially ... when the ques-
tioned government action results from a particularly difficult
reconciliation or 'accommodation' of the right of free speech with
74. See Hill v. Lakewood, 949 P.2d. at 109.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. Id. at 110.
78. Id.
79. 973 P.2d at 1248 n.1.
80. See Hill v. Thomas, 973 P.2d at 1251-53 (citations omitted).
250 [Vol. 22:239
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another right fundamental in our constellation of rights."8 ' The
fundamental right balanced against the plaintiffs' First Amend-
ment rights, the court concluded, was other individuals' right to
privacy, represented in the right of access to "counseling and
treatment" at Colorado health care facilities.8 2
The Supreme Court of Colorado next determined that the
Court's constitutional analysis imposed in Schenck was inappli-
cable for two reasons.8 3 First, Schenck involved an injunction,
subjecting the regulation to "'a somewhat more stringent appli-
cation of general First Amendment principles"'8 4 than a gener-
ally applicable statute such as the one at issue.8 5 Second, the
statute was less restrictive than the Schenck injunction because
it placed no duty upon the plaintiffs to withdrawal from within
the eight-foot limited floating buffer zone.86
The court, noting that both lower courts had found the stat-
ute was content-neutral and the plaintiffs no longer contended
otherwise, concluded that the proper analysis of the statute was
under the "time, place, and manner" criteria announced in
Ward.8 7 Applying the Ward criteria, the Supreme Court of Colo-
rado found that the statute was significantly tailored88 to serve
a significant government interest 8 9 and left open ample alterna-
tive channels of communication.9" The court held that the stat-
ute was a valid time, place, and manner restriction and
affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. 91
81. Id. at 1252 (citations omitted).
82. See id. at 1252-53.
83. See id. at 1254-55.
84. Id. at 1255 (quoting Madsen, 512 U.S. at 763).
85. Hill v. Thomas, 973 P.2d at 1255.
86. See id. at 1258.
87. See id. at 1256.
88. See id. at 1257. "[Iln any scenario, petitioners are free to attempt to speak
with whomever they wish and they will not violate the statute," so long as they do
not "knowingly approach" individuals within eight feet to do so. Id.
89. Hill v. Thomas, 973 P.2d at 1258. The statute was enacted by the General
Assembly out of concern for "the safety of individuals seeking wide-ranging health
care services, not merely abortion counseling and procedures." Id.
90. See id. "Petitioners, indeed, everyone, are still able to protest, counsel,
shout, implore, dissuade, persuade, educate, inform, and distribute literature re-
garding abortion. They just cannot knowingly approach within eight feet of an in-
dividual who is within 100 feet of a health care facility entrance without that
individual's consent." Id.
91. See id. at 1259.
2001] 251
13
252 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:239
IV. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISION
A. The Majority Opinion
The plaintiffs appealed the decision of the Supreme Court
of Colorado and filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the
United States Supreme Court. The Court granted the writ on
September 28, 1999.92 Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of
the majority,9 3 concluding that the statute met the content-neu-
trality standard in Ward and was a valid time, place, and man-
ner regulation. 94 The Court affirmed the judgment of the
Supreme Court of Colorado and upheld the constitutional valid-
ity of the statute.95
After examining the plaintiffs' First Amendment interests
and Colorado's interest in protecting the privacy of its citizens, 96
the Court commented on the content-neutrality of the statute
under Ward.9 7 The Court concluded that the statute met the
Ward standard for three independent reasons. 98 First, the stat-
ute was a regulation of "places where some speech may occur,"
rather than a "'regulation of speech.' " 99 Second, the statute
"was not adopted 'because of disagreement with the message it
conveys. '" 100 Finally, the statute was justified without reference
to the content of regulated speech, as Colorado's "interests in
protecting access and privacy, and providing the police with
92. Hill v. Colorado, 527 U.S. 1068 (1999).
93. Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer joined in the
majority opinion. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. at 705.
94. See Hill v. Thomas, 973 P.2d at 1259.
95. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. at 735.
96. See id. at 713-20.
The First Amendment interests of the petitioners are clear and undisputed
•.. [o]n the other hand, petitioners do not challenge the legitimacy of the
state interests . . . [tihat interest may justify a special focus on unimpeded
access to health care facilities and the avoidance of potential trauma to pa-
tients associated with confrontational protests.
Id. at 714-15. The Court noted that, while it did not address whether there is a
"'right to avoid unpopular speech in a public forum,'" its prior cases "repeatedly
recognized the interests of unwilling listeners in situations where 'the degree of
captivity makes it impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid expo-
sure.'" Id. at 718 (quoting Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975)).
97. See id. at 718-20.
98. See id. at 719.
99. See id. at 719.
100. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. at 719.
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clear guidelines are unrelated to the content of the demonstra-
tors' speech." 10 1
The plaintiffs argued that the statute was not "content-
neutral insofar as it applie[d] to some oral communication."10 2
Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that the statute was content-
based because the content of oral statements made by an ap-
proaching speaker had to be examined in order to determine
whether the knowing approach was "'for the purpose of ... en-
gaging in oral protest, education, or counseling"' and covered by
the statute. 103 After commenting that this theory was not men-
tioned in any of the four Colorado opinions and had likely been
waived, the Court stated that it had "never held, or suggested,
that it is improper to look at the content of an oral or written
statement in order to determine whether a rule of law applies to
a course of conduct."10 4 With respect to conduct regulated under
the statute, the Court determined that it was "unlikely that
there would often be a need to know exactly what words were
spoken in order to determine" if the statute applied. 105 Moreo-
ver, if theoretically a case arose in which it was necessary to
review the content of speech to make such a determination, no
more than a cursory examination would be required. 10 6 The
Court concluded that the statute "simply establishes a minor
place restriction on an extremely broad category of communica-
tions with unwilling listeners," 10 7 and was not motivated by a
particular viewpoint, nor placed restrictions on a particular
viewpoint. 0 The Court held that the Colorado courts had cor-
rectly concluded that the statute was content-neutral. 10 9
Next, the Court analyzed the statute under the Ward crite-
ria for time, place, and manner regulations. 110 Emphasizing
that a content-neutral regulation that "does not entirely fore-
close any means of communication, it may satisfy the tailoring
101. Id. at 719-20 (citations omitted).
102. Id. at 720.
103. See id.
104. Id. at 721.
105. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. at 721.
106. See id.
107. Id. at 723.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 724.
110. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. at 725-30.
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requirement even though it is not the least restrictive or least
obtrusive means of serving the statutory goal,""' the Court ex-
amined each of the three types of communications regulated by
the statute. 1 2 With respect to the display of signs, the Court
said that "[t]he [eight]-foot separation between the speaker and
the audience should not have any adverse impact on the read-
ers' ability to read signs displayed by demonstrators."" 3 With
respect to oral communications, the Court found that statutory
distance would "make it more difficult for the speaker to be
heard," but allowed the speaker to communicate at a "'normal
conversation distance."' 4 Finally, with respect to leafleting,
the Court found that it seemed possible that the eight-foot ra-
dius "could hinder the ability of a leafletter to deliver handbills
to some unwilling recipients. " 1 5 The Court concluded, however,
that the statute did not prevent a leafletter from standing and
proffering his or her material to oncoming pedestrians." 6
After determining that each of the requirements did not en-
tirely foreclose any means of communication, the Court turned
its attention to the locations where the regulations were appli-
cable. 1 7 In addition to a substantial state interest in controlling
activity around certain public places,"18 the Court noted the
"unique concerns that surround health care facilities. " 119 The
Court found that Colorado had responded to its substantial and
legitimate interest in protecting persons attempting to enter
111. Id. at 726.
112. See id. at 725-30.
113. Id. at 726. The Court suggested that the separation might actually aid
the audience's ability to see the signs. Id. It was also noted that the statute placed
no limits on the number, size, text, or images of the signs. Id.
114. Id. at 726-27 (quoting Schenck, 519 U.S. at 377). The Court also noted
that the statute placed no limitations "on the number of speakers or the noise
level[.]" Id. at 726.
115. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. at 727.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 728. The Court stated "in determining whether the statute is nar-
rowly tailored, we have noted that '[wie must, of course, take account of the place
to which the regulations apply in determining whether these restrictions burden
more speech than necessary.'" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Madsen, 512
U.S. at 772).
118. Id. at 728. The Court has recognized special government interests sur-
rounding, schools, courthouses, polling places, and private homes. Id. (citations
omitted).
119. Id. (citations omitted).
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such facilities, who are "often in particularly vulnerable physi-
cal and emotional conditions" by enacting "an exceedingly mod-
est restriction on the speakers' ability to approach."120 The
Court found that the statute's prophylactic approach "[might]
be the best way to provide protection, and, at the same time, by
offering clear guidance and avoiding subjectivity, to protect
speech itself."' 21 Finally, the Court noted that the restriction ap-
plied only within 100 feet of health care facilities, interfering
far less on a speaker's ability to communicate than restrictions
that the Court had upheld in prior cases. 122 The statute, the
Court concluded, was thus reasonable and narrowly tailored
under the Ward criteria for time, place, and manner
regulations. 123
The Court next addressed the plaintiffs' overbreadth argu-
ment, rejecting both of the contentions raised. 124 The Court first
rejected the plaintiffs' contentions that the statute was uncon-
stitutional because its coverage extended beyond the specific
concerns leading to its enactment. The Court found the stat-
ute's comprehensiveness was "a virtue, not a vice" and that
there was evidence that the General Assembly did not aim to
discriminate against particular speech. 125 The Court next re-
jected the plaintiffs' contention that the statute banned virtu-
ally all forms of protected expression, stating that the statute
did not "ban" any speech, but that it "merely regulates the
places where communications may occur."1 26 The Court held
that these arguments were not persuasive in demonstrating
that the statute was overly broad within the meaning of the
overbreadth doctrine. 127
120. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. at 729.
121. Id.
122. See id. at 730; see, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1998); Heffron v.
Int'l Soc'y for the Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
123. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. at 730.
124. See id. at 731. The plaintiffs' overbreadth argument had two parts: (1)
the statute protects too many people in too many places, as opposed to protecting
patients at the facilities where confrontational speech had occurred and (2) it
"bans" virtually the universe of protected expression, including displays of signs,
distribution of literature, and mere verbal statements. Id.
125. Id. at 731.
126. Id. at 731.
127. See id. at 732. "[Tlhe overbreadth doctrine enables litigants 'to challenge
a statute, not because their own rights of free expression are violated, but because
of a judicial prediction or assumption that the statute's very existence may cause
20011 255
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Likewise, the Court was not persuaded by the plaintiffs' ar-
guments 128 that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. 129
The Court found that, because the statute contained a scienter
requirement of "knowingly," it seemed quite remote that people
of ordinary intelligence would not understand what conduct it
prohibited. 30 Moreover, speculation about possible vagueness
in the hypothetical situations presented by the plaintiffs was
insufficient to support their facial challenge, as the statute was
"surely valid 'in the vast majority of its intended applica-
tions.'"' 3 ' The Court similarly found that the specificity of the
zones described by that statute gave adequate guidance and an
acceptable degree of judgment to law enforcement
authorities. 32
Finally, the Court addressed the plaintiffs' claim that the
statute's consent requirement imposed an unconstitutional
"prior restraint" on protected speech. 133 In dismissing this argu-
ment, the Court determined that such reasoning had been ad-
dressed and rejected in both Madsen and Schenck, and here
raised "an even lesser prior restraint concern" because no
speaker was completely banned. 34 Furthermore, the Court rea-
soned, concerns about prior restraint relate only to restrictions
imposed by official censorship, while the regulations in the pre-
sent case "only appl[ied] if the pedestrian does not consent to
the approach." 135
others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or ex-
pression.'" Id. at 731 (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973)).
Here, plaintiffs failed to persuade the Court that the statute's impact on other
speakers would differ from its impact on their own practices. Id. at 732.
128. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. at 732. The plaintiffs challenged that the
statute lacked requisite clarity in three parts of subsection (3): (1) "the meaning of
'protest, education, or counseling"'; (2) "the 'consent' requirement"; and (3) "the
determination of whether one is 'approaching' within eight feet of another." Id.
129. See id. "A statute can be impermissibly vague for either of two indepen-
dent reasons. First, if it fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable
opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits. Second, if it authorizes or
even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Id. (citing Chicago v.
Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999)).
130. See id.
131. Id. at 733 (quoting United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 23 (1960)).
132. See id. (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972)).
133. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. at 733.
134. Id. at 733-34.
135. Id. at 734.
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B. The Concurring Opinion
Justice Souter's concurrence 136 gave further support to the
conclusion that the statute was a content-neutral regulation of
speech, rather than a content-based discrimination against the
discussion of particular subjects. 137 The permissibility of a time,
place, or manner restriction, Souter asserted, "does not depend
on showing that the particular behavior or mode of delivery has
no association with a particular subject or opinion."138 Rather,
"[tihe principal inquiry in determining content neutrality... is
whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech be-
cause of a disagreement with the message it conveys.., and not
because of [the particular] behavior [or model identified with its
delivery."139 Souter found that the facts overwhelmingly demon-
strated that the statute was a valid content-neutral regulation,
imposed only to regulate the behavior of protestors, not the
messages they conveyed.140
C. The Dissenting Opinions
In his dissenting opinion,' 4 ' Justice Scalia began by stating
the Court today continues and expands its assault upon [abortion
opponents'] individual right to persuade women contemplating
abortion that what they are doing is wrong. Because, like the rest
of our abortion jurisprudence, today's decision is in stark contra-
diction of the constitutional principles we apply in all other con-
texts, I dissent. 42
In contrast with the majority, Justice Scalia found that the stat-
ute was content-based, and invalid under proper strict scrutiny
treatment.143
136. Justices O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined in concurring. Id. at 735-
41 (Souter, J., concurring).
137. See id.
138. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. at 736 (Souter, J., concurring). Souter addition-
ally stated, "There is always a correlation with subject and viewpoint when the law
regulates conduct that has become the signature of one side of a controversy. But
that does not mean that every regulation of such distinctive behavior is content
based as First Amendment doctrine employs that term." Id. at 737.
139. Id. at 737 (citations omitted).
140. See id.
141. Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia in dissenting. See id. at 741-65
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 741-42.
143. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. at 741-65 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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In the first section of his opinion, Scalia asserted that, re-
gardless of what might be found as to the other types of expres-
sion, the statute's regulation of oral "protest, education, or
counseling" is obviously and undeniably content-based.'" The
content-based discrimination, he stated, was in regard to a
speaker's purpose for approaching within eight feet of another
person without first obtaining consent. 145 Scalia found that the
regulation which operated only to restrict speech that communi-
cated a message of protest, education, or counseling presented
the risk that the legislation would lend itself to "'invidious,
thought-control purposes'." 46 The purpose of the statute, as en-
acted and as realistically applied, he concluded, was to restrict
the "'right to protest or counsel against certain medical proce-
dures' on the sidewalks and streets surrounding health care fa-
cilities." 47 In regard to leafleting and picketing, Scalia found
these actions so "intimately and unavoidably connected with
traditional speech" that the statute was "a regulation of speech
itself."148 Oral communication, leafleting, and picketing can be
regulated, he stated, but not on the basis of content without sat-
isfying strict scrutiny analysis. 149 Under such an analysis, he
stated, "if protecting people from unwelcome communications
([based on a state] interest [that] the Court posits) is a compel-
ling state interest, the First Amendment is a dead letter." 50
In the second part of his dissent, Scalia contended that the
statute did not even meet Ward's less exacting time, place, and
manner criteria.15' Scalia first addressed his belief that there
144. Id. at 742.
145. See id. Scalia stated:
A speaker wishing to approach another for the purpose of communicating
any message except one of protest, education, or counseling may do so with-
out first securing the other's consent. Whether a speaker must first obtain
permission before approaching within eight feet - and whether he will be
sent to prison for doing so - depends entirely on what he intends to say when
he gets there.
Id.
146. Id. at 743 (quoting Masden, 512 U.S. at 794 (Scalia, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part)).
147. Id. at 744 (alteration in original) (quoting CoLo. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122(1)
(1999)).
148. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. at 745 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 748-49.
151. See id. at 744-65.
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was "a bit of disagreement" between the State of Colorado 152
and the Court15 3 in construing the state interest sought to be
advanced by the statute. 54 He next discussed the "obvious inva-
lidity" of the statute, assuming first that the state interest was
the one which the Court had "invented" and then the one which
the State of Colorado had actually asserted. 155
Scalia found that, assuming the state interest sought to be
advanced by the statute was as construed by the Court, protec-
tion of the "right to be left alone" was "not an interest that
[might] be legitimately weighed against the speakers' First
Amendment rights .. ."156 In addition to attacking the major-
ity's reliance on and misreading of Justice Brandeis' dissent in
Olmstead v. United States,15 7 Scalia pointed to the Court's own
refusal in Schenck to acknowledge a "'right of the people ap-
proaching and entering the facilities to be left alone." ' 158 In con-
trast, he contended the Court has "consistently held that 'the
152. Id. at 749. Scalia stated:
Colorado has identified in the text of the statute itself the interest it sought
to advance: to ensure that the State's citizens may 'obtain medical counsel-
ing and treatment in an obstructed manner' by 'preventing the willful ob-
struction of a person's access to medical counseling and treatment at a
health care facility.'
Id. (quoting CoLo. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122(1)). He also found the State's interests
were confirmed by the State's present brief, which identified that the statute was
to address "conduct shown to impede access, endanger safety and health, and
strangle effective law enforcement." Id. at 750 (quoting Brief for Respondents at
15).
153. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 750 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia stated
"The Court nevertheless concludes that the Colorado provision is narrowly tailored
to serve ... the State's interest in protecting its citizens' rights to be left alone from
unwanted speech." Id.
154. See id. Scalia asserted that this was the first case in which the Supreme
Court had relied on a state interest "not only unasserted by the State, but posi-
tively repudiated." Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 751 (citations omitted).
157. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1938). In dissenting, Brandeis
"characterize[d] the 'unwilling listeners' interest in avoiding unwanted communi-
cation' as an 'aspect of the broader 'right to be left alone."" Hill v. Colorado, 530
U.S. at 751 (quoting Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478).
158. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. at 750 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Schenck,
519 U.S. at 357). In Schenck, the Court stated "[als a general matter, we have
indicated that in public debate our own citizens must tolerate insulting, and even
outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate breathing space to the freedoms
protected by the First Amendment." Id. at 750, 752 (alteration in original) (quoting
Schenck, 519 U.S. at 383).
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Constitution does not permit the government to decide which
types of otherwise protected speech are sufficiently offensive to
require protection for the unwilling listener or viewer.' "159 Scalia
concluded that the state interest as construed by the Court was
insufficient to justify the statute, as no constitutional principle
could be derived from precedent either limiting speakers' rights
to direct offensive messages against unwilling listeners or sup-
porting citizens' "rights to be left alone" in the public forum. 160
Scalia argued that, assuming the state interest sought to be
advanced was as described by the State of Colorado, subsection
(3) of the statute prohibited a vast amount of speech that did
not correspond to any interest in the "preservation of unim-
peded access to health care facilities.' 161 He asserted that,
rather than justifying the statute's violation of the narrow tai-
loring principle, the majority incorrectly construed Ward to im-
ply that so long as "'a content-neutral regulation does not
entirely foreclose any means of communication, it may satisfy
the tailoring requirement' ... .,,162 Scalia argued that Ward only
held "that narrow tailoring is not synonymous with 'least re-
strictive alternative,'" and neither it, nor any other case, sug-
gested that the narrow tailoring requirement could be relaxed
when other speech alternatives are available. 163 Scalia also crit-
icized the majority's discussion of the means of communication
left open by the statute as "willful ignorance." 164
In contrast to the majority's conclusion that the statute's
prophylactic approach was a virtue, Scalia found the prophylac-
159. Id. at 751-52 (quoting Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210
(1975)).
160. Id. at 752-55.
161. Id. at 755. Scalia noted that the statute "attaches to every person" within
the regulated zone, "regardless of whether that person is seeking to enter or exit [a
health care] facility". Id. Additionally, the statute protects those entering or exit-
ing the facilities not only from speech which is "so intimidating or threatening as
to impede access" but also from "unconsented-to approaches for the purposes of
[leafleting, picketing or] oral protest, education, or counseling." Id.
162. Id.
163. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. at 756 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
164. Id. Scalia found the majority's suggestion that the eight-foot zone along a
public sidewalk allowed communication to take place at a normal conversational
distance "absurd," particularly in the context of "counseling" or "educating." Id.
Similarly, he found the statute's consent requirements rendered communicating
by leafleting "utterly ineffectual." Id. at 757.
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tic restriction impermissible, for it did not respond precisely to
the "'substantive problem which legitimately concerns' the
State."'165 There was, Scalia concluded, an "insufficient nexus"
between assuring access to health care facilities and banning
communication within eight feet. 166 Consequently, the regula-
tion burdened substantially more speech than necessary to
achieve the particular interest the State asserted. 167 Scalia con-
tended "[this] is what the doctrine of overbreadth is all about"168
and "[t]he First Amendment stands as a bar to exactly this type
of prophylactic legislation."169 Lastly, Scalia found that the ma-
jority's consideration of the location where the regulations were
applicable was incomplete, as the location had become "by ne-
cessity . . . a forum of last resort for those who oppose
abortion."170
In a separate dissent, Justice Kennedy voiced agreement
with Justice Scalia's First Amendment analysis and addition-
ally set forth his view that the Court's decision conflicted with
the essence of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.
Casey. 171 Kennedy first remarked that "[t]o employ Ward's com-
plete framework is a mistake at the outset, for Ward applies
only if a statute is content-neutral." 172 This statute imposed
content-based restrictions on speech, he found, by virtue of the
terms used,173 the categories employed, 174 and the conditions of
165. Id. at 759 (quoting Member of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers, 466 U.S.
789, 810 (1984)). "'Broad prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are sus-
pect .... Precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely
touching our most precious freedoms.'" Id. (quoting NAACP v. Burton, 371 U.S.
415, 438 (1963)).
166. Id. at 759.
167. Id.
168. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. at 760-61 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 761.
170. Id. at 763.
171. See id. at 765-92.
172. Id. at 765-66.
173. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. at 767 (Kennedy, J. dissenting). Kennedy
found that the terms "oral protest, education, or counseling" in the context of con-
duct surrounding health care facilities "concern a narrow range of topics - indeed,
one topic in particular." Id.
174. Id. at 768. Kennedy stated [t]o say that one citizen can approach an-
other to ask the time or the weather forecast or the directions to Main Street but
not to initiate discussion on one of the most basic moral and political issues in all of
contemporary discourse.., is an astonishing view of the First Amendment." Id.
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enforcement. 175 Kennedy contended the majority further com-
pounded its mistake by finding that the regulation was view-
point neutral, as the object of the statute was "to restrict
speakers on one side of the debate: those who protest abor-
tions" 17 6 and its operation reflected that objective. 177 The major-
ity's holding, he concluded, allowed Colorado to "punish speech
because of its content and viewpoint." 78 Like Scalia, Kennedy
also attacked the majority's conclusion that precedent sup-
ported a right to be left alone in the public forum. 79 In contrast
with the majority, he found that applicable precedent expressly
denied that a right to be left alone existed in a public forum. 80
Rejecting the majority's contention that the statute's pro-
phylactic approach was a virtue, Kennedy found the statute to
be invalid under the constitutional doctrines of overbreadth and
vagueness.' 8 ' In particular, he noted that "protesting, educa-
tion, and counseling" were imprecise words and "[n]o custom,
tradition, or legal authority gives these terms the specificity re-
quired to sustain a criminal prohibition on speech." 18 2 As such,
Kennedy asserted, the statute's imprecision subjected it to po-
tentially arbitrary enforcement and had a chilling effect on
speech in violation of the Constitution.1 8 3
Kennedy also found the majority's application of the Ward
time, place, and manner criteria erroneous, particularly in its
175. Id. at 766. Kennedy asserted "[wihen a citizen approaches another on the
sidewalk in a disfavored-speech zone, an officer of the State must listen to what
the speaker says... the officer may decide the speech has moved from the permis-
sible to the criminal. The First Amendment does not give the government such
power." Id. at 766-67.
176. Id. at 768. In asserting this argument, Kennedy referred to the regula-
tion's application only to medical facilities; the choice of the language "against"
certain medical procedures in the statute's preamble; and the statute's legislative
history. Id.
177. Id. at 769.
178. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. at 769 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
179. See id. at 771. Kennedy stated "Today's decision is an unprecedented
departure from this Court's teachings respecting unpopular speech in public fora."
Id. at 772.
180. See id.
181. See id. at 770-75. Kennedy found the statute's operative terms and
phrases were not properly defined, as its words were imprecise and lacked requi-
site specificity. See id.
182. Id. at 773.
183. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. at 773 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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discussion of narrow tailoring. 8 4 He stated that an essential re-
quirement under Ward was that the regulation in question does
not "'burden substantially more speech than is necessary to fur-
ther the government's legitimate interest.'"'1 5 Kennedy found
that the statutory language of "oral protest, education, or coun-
seling," construed by Colorado and the Court to restrict all top-
ics of conversation within the statutory proscription, violated
this requirement. 8 6 He reasoned that if the statute was enacted
to respond to incidents of disorderly or unlawful conduct near
health facilities, state criminal and tort law provided alterna-
tives to restricting speech. 8 7 If the statute was enacted to "pro-
tect distraught women who are embarrassed, vexed, or
harassed," Kennedy asserted that the majority improperly
failed to explain why less restrictive means could not be em-
ployed to serve that interest. 88 Finally, in regard to narrow tai-
loring, Kennedy found that the majority's consideration of the
place of regulation was flawed, as the statute applied to tradi-
tional public fora 8 9 which was likely the last, if not the only,
place for protestors to communicate their message. 90
Kennedy also concluded that the statute did not meet the
Ward standard that ample alternative channels for communica-
tions be left open.' 9 ' In regard to oral communication, he found
that the inability to interact in person prevented protestors
from "using speech in the time, place, and manner most vital to
the protected expression."1 92 He found that the statute fore-
closed "peaceful leafleting, a mode of speech with deep roots in
our Nation's history and traditions."193 Emphasizing that "[t]he
means of expression at stake here are of controlling impor-
tance,"' 94 Kennedy concluded that the statutory regulations
184. See id. at 771-91.
185. Id. at 776 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799).
186. Id. (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 800).
187. Id. Kennedy specifically mentioned that shoving or hitting is a battery
actionable in criminal law and offensive touching of the body or an object closely
identified with the body is actionable in tort law. See id. at 777.
188. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. at 777-78 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
189. See id. at 779.
190. See id.
191. Id. at 780 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 791).
192. Id.
193. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. at 780-81 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 788. He later stated
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burdened speech in the location where "the Court should ex-
pend its utmost effort to vindicate free speech .... -195
V. DISCUSSION
Prior to Hill v. Colorado, it remained unresolved what
treatment the Court would give statutes regulating speech sur-
rounding health care facilities in light of Madsen and
Schenck. 96 In Madsen, the Court distinguished content-neu-
tral, generally applicable statutes from content-neutral injunc-
tions, finding the latter carried "'greater risks of censorship and
discriminatory application'... .",197 Correspondingly, the Mad-
sen Court announced a "more stringent" standard of scrutiny
applicable for content-neutral injunctions, holding that the
proper inquiry was "whether the challenged provisions of the
injunction burdened no more speech than necessary to serve a
significant government interest."198 In Hill v. Colorado, the
Court expressly held that the Madsen standard of scrutiny does
not apply to generally applicable statutes and such statutes are
properly analyzed under the criteria announced in Ward. 99
In addition to resolving the issue of treatment, Hill v. Colo-
rado provides the framework that the majority of the Court will
use in reviewing generally applicable legislation that regulates
speech in the traditional public forum surrounding health care
facilities. 200 The three principal components of this framework
include: (1) content-neutrality, (2) narrow tailoring to serve sig-
nificant government interests, and (3) ample alternative chan-
nels of communication.
No better illustration of the immediacy of speech, of the urgency of persua-
sion, of the preciousness of time, is presented than in this case. Here the
citizens who claim First Amendment protection seek it for speech which, if it
is to be effective, must take place at the very time and place a grievous
moral wrong, in their view, is about to occur.
Id. at 792.
195. Id. at 789.
196. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
197. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 764. However, the Court was cognizant that injunc-
tions may carry some advantages over generally applicable statutes "in that they
can be narrowly tailored by a trial judge to afford more precise relief than a stat-
ute." Id. at 765.
198. Id. at 765; see also supra notes 30-43 and accompanying text.
199. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. at 718.
200. See id.
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A. Determination of Content-Neutrality
The principal issue dividing the Hill v. Colorado Court was
whether the statute's regulations, particularly in regard to "oral
protest, education and counseling," were facially content-neu-
tral or content-based. 201 As discussed in Part II, content-neu-
trality is a threshold consideration because the distinction
between content-neutral and content-based regulations is de-
terminative of the level of scrutiny to which the court will sub-
ject the statute.2 2 In Hill v. Colorado, the majority of the Court
held that the principal inquiry as to content-neutrality was
"'whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech
because of disagreement with the message it conveys.' 20 3
The majority's opinion provided three independent reasons
for why it found the Colorado statute content-neutral under this
inquiry.20 4 The first of these reasons suggests that, for the pur-
pose of determining content-neutrality, the majority of the
Court considers regulations of speech-related conduct outside of
health care facilities a "regulation of the places where some
speech may occur" and "not a 'regulation of speech.'"205 Addi-
tionally, each of these reasons demonstrates that the majority
of the Court will interpret statutory language such as "oral pro-
test, education, or counseling" broadly, and not limit its con-
struction to the speech-related conduct that motivated its
enactment. 20 6 Finally, the majority's statement that it is not
"improper to look at the content of an oral or written statement"
in order to determine if the statute applies to particular speech
indicates that challenges based upon hypothetical situations
will not be sufficient to sustain a facial challenge of similar
statutes. 20 7
201. See id. at 719.
202. See supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text.
203. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. at 719 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 791).
204. See id. These reasons were (1) the statute was not a "regulation of
speech," it was a regulation of the places where some speech may occur; (2) the
statute's language makes no reference to content of speech and its restriction apply
equally to all demonstrators, regardless of their viewpoint; and (3) the State's in-
terests in enacting the statute were unrelated to the content of the demonstrators'
speech. See id.
205. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. at 719.
206. See id. at 720-25.
207. Id. at 721.
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B. Narrow Tailoring to Serve Significant Government
Interests
Finding the statute content-neutral, the Hill v. Colorado
Court analyzed the statute using the Ward "time, place, and
manner" criteria.208 The majority's discussion in Hill gives fur-
ther clarification of the criteria's application and indicates how
the criteria are properly satisfied in the context of regulation of
speech surrounding health care facilities.20 9
The majority recognized two types of state interests that
were sufficient to satisfy the requirement of "significant state
interest" in regulating speech and speech-related conduct sur-
rounding health care facilities. 210 The first was the State's inter-
est in using its police powers to "protect the health and safety of
[its] citizens," which may legitimately justify a focus on protect-
ing "unimpeded access to health care facilities and the avoid-
ance of potential trauma to patients associated with
confrontation protests."21' This type of state interest was previ-
ously recognized as sufficient in both Madsen and Schenck.21 2
The second type of state interest the Court recognized was the
State's interest in protecting unwilling listeners' "interest in
avoiding unwanted communication," which the Court charac-
terized as part of broader "right to be let alone."21 3
In determining that the statute was narrowly tailored to
serve these state interests, the Court emphasized, "when a con-
tent-neutral regulation does not entirely foreclose any means of
communication, it may satisfy the tailoring requirement even
though it is not the least restrictive or least intrusive means of
serving the statutory goal."214 The majority's approach indi-
cates that the Court adheres to this emphasis very literally, and
will uphold regulations that burden communication through va-
208. See id. at 725. These criteria, as stated in Ward, require that a content-
neutral, generally applicable statute is "'narrowly tailored to serve [a] significant
government interest, and [that it] leave [s] open ample alternative channels of com-
munication for communication of the information.'" 491 U.S. at 791 (citations
omitted).
209. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. at 714-20.
210. See id. at 715.
211. Id. (citations omitted).
212. See supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text.
213. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. at 716 (citations omitted).
214. Id. at 726.
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rious speech media as long as each of the media are not com-
pletely foreclosed. 215
Also, the Court found three features possessed by the Colo-
rado statute that distinguished it from the "floating buffer zone"
struck down in Schenck.216 First, unlike the fifteen-foot zone in
Schenck, the statute's eight-foot zone "allows the speaker to
communicate at a 'normal conversational distance. '"' 21 7 Second,
the statute's "approach" requirement allows protestors to re-
main in one place and allow individuals to pass them within
eight feet without causing the protestor to violate the statute.218
Third, the statute's "knowingly" requirement protected protes-
tors from inadvertently violating the statute. 21 9 These careful
distinctions made by the Court seem to suggest three pertinent
statutory conditions that a statute regulating speech-related
conduct surrounding health care facilities must possess to with-
stand judicial scrutiny. Finally, the Court's praise of the stat-
ute's prophylactic approach indicates that the Court may favor,
rather than disapprove of, bright-line prophylactic rules in the
regulation of speech in these circumstances. 220
C. Ample Alternative Channels of Communication
Concluding that the statute was narrowly tailored to serve
a significant government interest, the Court found the eight-
foot zone of separation left open "ample room to communicate a
message through speech" and that "[s]igns, pictures, and voice
itself can cross an 8-foot gap with ease."22' This reasoning by
the Court closely parallels its finding that the statute was nar-
rowly tailored and indicates that so long as a regulation does
not foreclose an entire medium or method of speech, the statute
will meet this final requirement. 222
215. See id. at 726-31.
216. See id. at 712.
217. Id. at 726 (quoting Schenk, 519 U.S. at 377).
218. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. at 713.
219. See id.
220. See id. at 729.
221. Id.
222. See id. at 725-26.
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V. CONCLUSION
Prior to Hill v. Colorado, it remained unresolved what
treatment the Court would give legislation regulating speech
surrounding health care facilities in light of Madsen and
Schenck. In Hill v. Colorado, the Court expressly held that the
Madsen standard of scrutiny does not apply to generally appli-
cable statutes and such statutes are properly analyzed under
the criteria announced in Ward v. Rock Against Racism. In ad-
dition to resolving the issue of treatment, Hill v. Colorado pro-
vided the framework the majority of the Court will use in
reviewing generally applicable legislation that regulates speech
in the traditional public forum surrounding health care
facilities.
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol22/iss1/6
